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ABSTRACT — We distinguish between two categories of  belief  — thin belief  and thick belief  — and provide evid-
ence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make in-
formative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifcally, 
we show that if  the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of  otherwise extremely puzzling recent experi-
mental fndings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We 
also suggest that the distinction can be applied to debates in the philosophy of  mind and metaethics.
Keywords: belief | knowledge | entailment thesis | folk psychology
1. An ambivalent introduction
Imagine an elected offcial, Michael, who emphas-
izes the importance of  giving to charity and help-
ing the poor in all of  his speeches. Michael com-
mands all the relevant facts and fgures about why 
it is good to help the less fortunate. He can explain 
exactly how giving will  help members of  his dis-
trict, as well as quantify the net beneft of  this for 
the overall well-being of  society as a whole. But as 
the  years  passed,  Michael  made fewer and fewer 
speeches  encouraging others  to help  the poor. In 
fact, on the day of  a crucial vote that would pass 
new aid legislation, Michael does literally nothing 
to  support  it,  even  though  he  could  easily  offer 
some support at almost no cost to himself. In light 
of  all that, does Michael believe that the aid legisla-
tion is important?
If  you’re like us, the question leaves you ambi-
valent.  On the one hand,  given his command of 
the facts  about why it would be good to help the 
less fortunate, it seems that on at least some level 
Michael thinks that the aid legislation is important. 
That is, on some level he accepts that the proposi-
tion <the aid legislation is important> is true. On 
the  other  hand,  when  given  the  opportunity,  he 
doesn’t  support  or  vote  the  bill  into  law,  which 
makes it seem that he doesn’t believe that the legis-
lation  is  important.  To  put  our  ambivalence  an-
other  way,  it  seems  that  on  a  purely  intellectual 
level,  Michael believes the proposition, whereas on 
a more practical level, he doesn’t.1
Or  consider  a  physics  student,  Stewart,  who 
pays close attention in class. He can explain exactly 
how  the  heliocentric  theory  of  the  solar  system 
works, all the observational and mathematical evid-
ence showing that planets orbit the sun and that the 
sun doesn’t orbit the planets. On the fnal exam for 
the course, Stewart answers that ‘the earth revolves 
around the sun’ and gets a perfect score for his de-
scription  of  how  the  heliocentric  theory  works. 
Nevertheless,  prior  to  starting  at  the  university 
Stewart was home-schooled by his parents. His par-
ents taught him that the earth is at the center of  the 
universe. And Stewart has always accepted what his 
parents have taught him.  In light of  all that, does 
Stewart believe that  the  earth revolves  around the 
sun?
Once again, the question leaves us ambivalent. 
On the one hand, given his command of  the facts, 
it seems that on at least some level Stewart thinks 
that the earth revolves around the sun. That is, on 
some  level  he  accepts  that  the  proposition  <the 
earth revolves around the sun> is true. After all, he 
1 This case has also been instrumental in motivating intu-
itions  in  debates  about  moral  motivation,  see Stocker 
(1979), Buckwalter and Turri (under review). 
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has seen and understood  the  compelling  evidence 
presented in his physics class regarding the move-
ment of  the earth around the sun.  On the other 
hand,  Stewart has always devoutly accepted  what 
his parents have taught him.  Holding on to these 
lessons from his childhood outside of  physics class, 
it seems that he doesn’t  believe that the earth re-
volves around the sun. Once again it seems to us 
that on some level the agent believes the proposi-
tion, whereas on a more practical level, he doesn’t.
In order to have convenient labels for these di-
vergent senses of  belief, let’s call them thin belief and 
thick belief. Although we’re not positioned to confd-
ently  defend  a  full-blown  analysis  of  either  cat-
egory, we can helpfully characterize them in a way 
that maps onto the ambivalence we feel about the 
earlier examples.
A thin belief  is a bare cognitive pro-attitude. To 
have a thin belief  that P, it suffces that you repres-
ent that P is true, regard it as true, or take it to be 
true.  Put another  way, thinly  believing P involves 
representing  and  storing  P  as  information.  It  re-
quires  nothing  more.  In  particular,  it  doesn’t  re-
quire you to like it that P is true, to emotionally endorse 
the truth of  P, to explicitly avow or assent to the truth 
of  P, or to actively promote an agenda that makes sense 
given P.2
A thick belief requires more than a bare cognit-
ive  pro-attitude.  As  a  rough  frst  approximation, 
thick belief  also involves  emotion or  conation. There 
might  be  many  ways  to  thicken belief  beyond  a 
bare cognitive pro-attitude. For example, in addi-
tion to representing and storing P as information, 
you might also like it that P is true,  emotionally endorse 
the truth of  P, explicitly avow or assent to  the truth of 
P, or actively promote an agenda that makes sense given 
P.3 Thick  belief  entails  thin  belief,  but  not  vice 
versa.
2 This is an initial approximation of  the category of  thin 
belief  for purposes of  introducing the discussion. In sec-
tion 5 we discuss some considerations which might lead 
to strengthening the minimal requirements of thin be-
lief. For now, and the essential point we wish to uphold, 
is that whatever the minimum requirements of  thin be-
lief  beyond mental representation, they clearly demand 
less than the minimum requirements of  thick belief. We 
thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to cla-
rify this point.
3 For more on the  different  ways  that  thin beliefs can be 
thickened, see Section 5. 
We suspect that thin and thick beliefs, as charac-
terized above, approximate genuine and genuinely 
distinct categories within folk psychology. That is, 
we suspect that the ambivalence we feel when con-
sidering the examples of  Michael and Stewart re-
fects our implicit competence with two related but 
distinct folk psychological categories, each of  which 
often fnds expression with ‘belief ’.  If  we’re right 
about that, it would be an important fact about folk 
psychology  with  implications  for  multiple  discip-
lines. For example, it would be relevant to research 
on belief  and belief-ascription in cognitive psycho-
logy, to theory-of-mind research in developmental 
psychology, to philosophers of  mind analyzing the 
concept of  belief,  and to epistemologists  studying 
the norms of  belief  and its relationship to know-
ledge.  We also think the distinction can contribute 
to substantive philosophical theorizing on belief  (a 
topic we will return to in Section 6).4
Thin and thick belief  both make appearances 
when philosophers and cognitive scientists charac-
terize  belief.  Something  approximating  the  cat-
egory of  thin belief  that we have in mind (although 
not explicitly labeled as “belief ”) dominates discus-
sions  in  contemporary  philosophy  of  mind  and 
cognitive  science  on  representationalist  models  of 
cognition. For example, Fred Dretske characterizes 
belief  merely  as  an  “inner  representation  of  the 
world,” something “represented . . . in the internal 
language  of  thought”  (Dretske  1983:  14). 
Moreover,  this view  of  belief  as  merely “saying 
something  in  the  internal  language  of  thought” 
now “dominates  philosophical  thinking”  (Dretske 
1983: 3).5 (We discuss more examples of  contem-
porary theorists employing the thin category of  be-
4 Also see theoretical work on what the “fragmentation” 
of  concepts  might  mean for a series  of  epistemic de-
bates (Greco forthcoming). 
5 Dretske (1988)  also focuses  on the  explanatory role of 
belief  in thought and behaviour. On standard represent-
ationalist models of  cognition, it might seem unusual to 
say that very simple organisms or computers represent-
ing information that  P “believe”  P is true,  or that the 
contents of  the early visual system are “believed” to be 
true. On the other hand, we suggest that it is much less 
unusual to say that these entities “on some level think” 
that  P.  In fact, this comports well with  the motivation 
for  our choice  of  terminology to  cue the category  of 
thin belief  below. We thank an anonymous reviewer for 
discussion on this point.
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lief  in Section 4 below.)
But  the  thick  sense  makes  important  appear-
ances in the history of  philosophy. For example, in 
the  Enquiry  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  Hume 
asks, what distinguishes mere imagination from be-
lief ? (All Hume quotes are from Hume 1748: §5.2.) 
The  distinction  can’t  be  in  terms  of  representa-
tional content, Hume argues, because whatever we 
believe we can equally well imagine. Neither is the 
distinguishing feature one of  storing, or being dis-
posed to store, the content in memory.  Rather,  on 
Hume’s view, a distinctive “feeling” distinguishes be-
lief  from imagination. Belief is a “sentiment” with an 
“infuence on the passions,” ft to be a “governing 
principle  of  our actions.”  Hume expresses himself 
concisely in the following passage.
The imagination has the command over all its 
ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in 
all the ways possible. It may conceive fctitious 
objects with all the circumstances of  place and 
time. It may set them, in a manner, before our 
eyes, in their true colors, just as they might have 
existed. But as it is impossible, that this faculty 
of  imagination can ever, of  itself, reach belief, it 
is evident, that belief  consists not in the peculiar 
nature or order of  ideas,  but in the  manner of 
their conception, and in their feeling to the mind. 
I  confess,  that  it  is  impossible  perfectly  to ex-
plain this feeling or manner of  conception. We 
may make use of  words, which express some-
thing near it. But its true and proper name . . . 
is  belief;  which is  a  term, that  every one suff-
ciently understands in common life.
On Hume’s view, belief  ordinarily understood requires 
more than thin belief.  On Hume’s view, belief  or-
dinarily understood is thick belief.6
Ambivalence, suspicions,  and  implicit disagree-
ment  among   luminous predecessors can  work 
6 See Milgram 1995;  Sayre-McCord 2006 for  more on 
Hume's theory of  belief  and its  potential mismatch to 
some of the things latter-day “Humeans” hold about be-
lief.  We thank an anonymous reviewer for  encouraging 
us  to  clarify  this  point. For  related  views,  see  James 
1889: 21 and Peirce 1958, 1976.  James says, “In its in-
ner nature belief, or the sense of  reality, is a sort of  feel-
ing more allied to the emotions than to anything else,” 
and, “The emotion of  belief ” is “perfectly distinct, but 
perfectly indescribable in words.” Peirce says that belief 
is a kind of  “controlled and contented habit of  acting.”
wonders in the context of  discovery, but they’re in-
adequate in a context of  justifcation.  Having ex-
plained  our  motivation  for  positing  a  distinction 
between thin and thick belief, our goal in the re-
mainder of  this paper is to begin justifying it.  Fig-
uratively  speaking,  if  hypotheses  are  cars,  we’re 
making a downpayment on  ours.  In order to ac-
complish this, we will assume that the distinction between  
thin and thick belief is genuine and show that it makes 
informative predictions and helps to explain other-
wise puzzling observations.  In short, we will  judge  
the  hypothesis  by  its  fruits.  We  ask  others  to do the 
same.
Our point of  departure in this paper is the long-
held  view in epistemology  that  knowledge entails 
belief,  which we will  call the entailment thesis (Lehrer 
1968: 491).  Among contemporary epistemologists, 
the entailment thesis is almost unanimously accep-
ted  as  intuitively  obvious  and uncontroversial.  In 
this  respect,  it  is  often viewed as roughly on par 
with the factivity thesis, which says that knowledge re-
quires truth.7 Contemporary epistemologists fancy 
that this uncontroversial  consensus spans virtually 
the entire history of  Western philosophy, under the 
title, “the problem of  the Theaetetus.”  For example, 
here is how Roderick Chisholm, a titan of  twenti-
eth-century  epistemology,  matter-of-factly  puts 
matters in the third edition of  his infuential text-
book, Theory of  Knowledge.
If  you know that it is raining, then it  is  raining 
and you believe that it is raining. The point may 
be generalized by saying that, if  you have know-
ledge, then you have true belief. But knowledge 
is more than mere true belief.  For your belief 
that it is raining could be true even if  you didn’t 
know that it is raining. Perhaps you have simply 
made a lucky guess. What, then, must be  added 
to true belief  to get knowledge? Finding the an-
swer to this question is sometimes called, “the 
problem of  the  Theaetetus,”  since the question 
was frst clearly formulated by Plato in his dia-
logue of  that name. (Chisholm 1989: 90).
But  recently  several  experimental  philosophers 
have argued that the entailment thesis is neither ob-
7 For  some recent  controversy  surrounding  the  factivity 
thesis,  see  Hazlett  2010, Turri  2011a,  Hazlett  2012, 
Stokke 2013, Buckwalter and Turri, under review,  and 
Buckwalter, under review.
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vious, uncontroversial, nor widely accepted (Myers-
Schulz and Schwitzgebel,  forthcoming; Murray et 
al.  2012).  Indeed,  their  results  suggest  that  most 
people are perfectly willing to ascribe knowledge in 
the absence of  belief. And so it  may seem that a 
pall of  doubt falls over the entailment thesis and, in 
the process, diminishes the probative value of  “ex-
pert” intuition and consensus in philosophy.
Is this the beginning of  an unhappy end for the 
entailment  thesis?  We think  not,  but  it  will  take 
some hard work and ingenuity to  effectively resist 
the experimental challenge. Equipped with our dis-
tinction between thin and thick belief, we will argue 
that the experimental results, when properly under-
stood,  don’t  cast  doubt  on  the  entailment  thesis, 
when properly understood. The  true lesson of  the 
experimental  results  is  that  the  entailment  thesis 
should be understood in terms of  thin belief, whereas 
the experimental results in question should be un-
derstood in  terms of  thick  belief.  It  turns  out  that 
when people are primed to employ the category of 
thin belief, they respond exactly as we would expect 
if  they accepted the entailment thesis  (understood 
in  our  preferred  way).  Indeed,  when  understood 
properly, the entailment thesis is as firmly rooted as the  
factivity thesis in our ordinary ways of  thinking and 
speaking  about  knowledge.  Thus,  putting  the 
thick/thin  distinction  to  work  happily  reconciles 
our folkways with the longstanding dominant view.8 
This supports our hypothesis that thin belief and thick  
belief are genuine, distinct categories in folk psycho-
logy.
Here is the plan for the rest of  the paper. Sec-
tion 2 reviews the recent experimental challenge to 
the entailment thesis. Section 3 segues into our pos-
itive agenda. Section 4 motivates our preferred un-
derstanding of  the  entailment  thesis,  namely,  the 
thin  entailment  thesis:  knowledge  entails  thin  belief. 
Section  5  reports  three  experiments  that  test 
whether the thin entailment thesis is  widely accep-
ted; the results strongly suggest that it is. Section 6 
concludes the discussion by suggesting further, po-
8 See Travis (2005) for a discussion of  a particularly com-
pelling  rejection  of  the  entailment  thesis  by  Cook 
Wilson. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this refer-
ence.  Also see section 4 for  some  evidence suggesting 
that epistemologists  have tended to elucidate the rela-
tionship between knowledge and belief  in terms of  a 
thin category of  belief.
tentially  important  applications  of  the  distinction 
between thick and thin belief.
2. The experimental challenge to the en­
tailment thesis
Several  recent  experimental  studies  have  chal-
lenged  the  entailment  thesis.9 As  already  men-
tioned,  the  (simple,  unadorned)  entailment  thesis 
says that knowledge entails belief. More specifcally, 
the (simple, unadorned)  entailment thesis says that 
necessarily, if  you know that P, then you believe that 
P (see Armstrong 1969, p. 21). This section reviews 
the relevant experimental research.
2.1. Quizzing  Kate:  Myers-Schulz  and 
Schwitzgebel
Why think  that  the  entailment  thesis  is  true?  As 
Blake  Myers-Schulz  and  Eric  Schwitzgebel  point 
out, a common strategy is to claim that the thesis is 
“obvious”  and  faces  “no  convincing  counter-
examples.”  Some  philosophers  have  claimed  that 
there are convincing counterexamples (e.g. Radford 
1966), but their claim has met stiff  and widespread 
resistance (see e.g., Armstrong, 1969, Cohen, 1966, 
Jones, 1971, Lehrer, 1974). They’re accused of  hav-
ing peculiar, even perverse, intuitions about the rel-
evant cases.  Call  these maligned intuitions  anti-en-
tailment intuitions.
Though the discussion over anti-entailment in-
tuitions  largely  died  out  in  the  1970’s,  with  the 
dominant  response  being  Armstrong’s  (1969)  dis-
missal  of  anti-entailment  intuitions,  Radford 
claimed that the issue turned largely on what Eng-
lish speakers would or would not say about know-
ledge (Radford, 1966, p. 5).   The investigation of 
what English speakers would or would not say was 
never  taken  up  until  recently.  Myers-Schulz  and 
Schwitzgebel — suspecting that anti-entailment in-
tuitions are neither perverse nor peculiar — ran ex-
periments to see what laypeople thought about sev-
9 Or, at least, they challenge the view that the entailment 
thesis  is  either  widely  held,  intuitively  compelling  to 
most people,  or a principle of  folk psychology.  We ac-
knowledge  the  difference  between  this  challenge  and 
challenging the entailment thesis per se, even though the 
two  challenges  aren’t  unrelated.  Our  main  argument 
doesn’t hinge on always explicitly distinguishing the two 
challenges,  so for expository purposes we won’t always 
explicitly distinguish them in what follows.
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eral cases, including a version of Colin Radford’s 
Unconfdent  Examinee  case.  According  to  the 
story, Kate studies very hard for an exam on Eng-
lish history, and she is doing very well on the exam 
“until she comes to the fnal question,” which asks, 
“What year did Queen Elizabeth die?” Kate “re-
viewed this  date many times”  in  her  studies  and 
“had  even  recited”  it  “just  a  few  hours  earlier.” 
Moreover, when she reads the fnal question, she is 
initially “confdent” that she will “recollect the an-
swer.” But she is interrupted by a warning that time 
is  almost  up;  she  loses  confdence  and  becomes 
nervous; she tries to recall “but nothing comes to 
her”; fnally, “with a sigh of  disappointment,” she 
says to herself, “I’ll just have to guess the answer.” 
So she writes down “1603,” which is in fact the cor-
rect answer.
In a between-subjects design, Myers-Schulz and 
Schwitzgebel  asked  half  of  their  participants 
whether Kate “knows” that Queen Elizabeth died 
in  1603,  and  they  asked  the  other  half  whether 
Kate “believes” that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. 
Participants could answer either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. My-
ers-Schulz  and  Schwitzgebel  observed  that  87% 
answered that Kate knew, but only 37% answered 
that Kate believed. Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel 
ran further studies with several other cover stories, 
and  twice  they  found  similar  large disparities 
between  knowledge  ascription  and  belief  ascrip-
tion. The crucial point is that in multiple cases rates 
of  knowledge ascription  far surpassed rates of  be-
lief  ascription. Myers-Schulz  and  Schwitzgebel 
conclude that anti-entailment intuitions are neither 
peculiar,  perverse,  nor  uncommon.  Though  per-
haps not a majority, a substantial number of  people 
seem to exhibit anti-entailment intuitions in certain 
sorts  of  cases.  Advocates of  the entailment thesis 
must do better than just sit back and claim that the 
entailment thesis is obvious.
Of  course, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel’s ex-
perimental challenge could have turned out other-
wise. It could have turned out that rates of  know-
ledge  ascription  and  belief  ascription  matched. 
Had it turned out that way, it would have  instead 
provided  some evidence  that  philosophers  were 
right to claim that the entailment thesis is obvious.
2.2. Entailment,  dispositional  style:  Rose 
and Schaffer
David  Rose  and  Jonathan  Schaffer  (forthcoming) 
argue that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel’s studies 
don’t challenge the  entailment  thesis,  for  at  least 
two reasons. First, Rose and Schaffer point out that 
a  within-subjects design would have been more pro-
bative  than a  between-subjects  design  since  what 
one really wants to know is whether the same per-
son would attribute knowledge but deny belief. But 
when they re-ran the studies using a within-subjects 
design, the results were favorable to the anti-entail-
ment  camp:  over  50%  of  participants  ascribed 
knowledge  but  denied belief  to  Kate.  Moreover, 
64% of  those who ascribed knowledge denied be-
lief.  Second,  and  more  importantly,  Rose  and 
Schaffer argue that the entailment thesis should be 
understood in terms of  dispositional belief: necessar-
ily, if  you know that P, then you dispositionally be-
lieve  that  P.  However,  Myers-Schulz  and 
Schwitzgebel’s probes tended to elicit an occurrent 
reading of  ‘believe’.  So their results  don’t  pose a 
challenge to the entailment thesis, properly under-
stood.
Occurrent belief  is conscious endorsement. Dis-
positional belief  is information  stored in the mind 
available for endorsement. Dispositional beliefs are 
the kind of  beliefs that sleeping people have. When 
Harry is fast asleep, he doesn’t consciously endorse 
that his cousin, Dudley, is despicable. Nevertheless, 
when Harry  falls asleep, he  doesn’t lose his belief 
that  Dudley is  despicable.  Rather,  he retains  that 
belief  in dispositional form, as information stored 
in mind and available to him for later endorsement.
Rose and Schaffer’s critique naturally suggests a 
more pointed empirical test for whether laypeople 
share  the  anti-entailment  intuition: re-run  My-
ers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel’s studies using probes 
specifcally designed to elicit the dispositional read-
ing  of  ‘believe’.  If  most  participants  still  ascribe 
knowledge  but  deny dispositional  belief  to  Kate, 
then  people probably  don’t  fnd  the  entailment 
thesis intuitive, even when understood disposition-
ally.
In order to cue the dispositional sense of  belief, 
Rose  and  Schaffer  developed  several novel  tech-
niques.  For  example,  they  directly  asked  parti-
cipants  whether Kate has the relevant disposition: 
Is  Kate  disposed  to  believe  that  Queen  Elizabeth  died  in  
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1603?10 They also used a parenthetically qualifed 
probe: Did Kate still believe (in the sense that she still held  
the information in her mind, even if  she could not access it)  
that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603? When  questioned 
these ways,  roughly 60% of  participants ascribed 
both knowledge and belief  to Kate. Moreover,  of 
those who ascribed knowledge, approximately 70% 
ascribed belief.  This is exactly what we would ex-
pect  if  people  generally  accepted  the  entailment 
thesis.11 Rose and Schaffer also applied these tech-
niques to the other cases where  Myers-Schulz and 
Schwitzgebel  observed  results  consistent  with  a 
widely  shared anti-entailment  intuition.  In  each 
case,  cueing  the  dispositional  sense  of  belief re-
versed the earlier results.12
2.3. Of  dogs and gods:  Murray, Sytsma and 
Livengood
Dylan Murray, Justin Sytsma and Jonathan Liven-
10 In their experiments, Rose and Schaffer treat judgments 
about ‘what one is disposed’ to believe as one proxy for 
measuring what one dispositionally believes. Though for 
a possible distinction between these two things see Audi 
(1994).
11 To be clear, Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel do not claim 
that a majority of  people exhibit anti-entailment intu-
itions, only a substantial minority.  We invite readers to 
decide for themselves if  the 30% in Rose & Schaffer's 
experiment  on  dispositional  belief  constitute  such  a 
minority.
12 Myers-Schulz  & Schwitzgebel  also present  a  Prejudiced 
Professor case  involving  a  well-intentioned  liberal  pro-
fessor who harbours implicit biases towards certain stu-
dents. They fnd that 63% of  experimental participants 
agree that the professor knows that these students  are 
just  as  capable  as  her  other  students,  but  only  23% 
agreed that she believes it. In response, Rose & Schaffer 
argue that this fnding is an instance of  a larger phe-
nomenon in experimental philosophy known as the epi-
stemic  side-effect  effect  (see  Beebe  &  Buckwalter  2010) 
whereby moral considerations can infuence ascriptions 
of  knowledge and belief  (see Beebe forthcoming). How-
ever,  the  best  explanation  of  this  effect  remains  ex-
tremely controversial, since it is unclear whether this ef-
fect is due to a motivational bias (Alicke and Rose 2010) 
or whether it  is  a feature of  our  competence (Knobe 
2010).  Since the proper interpretation of  these effects is 
still an open question (see Knobe 2010 and Knobe et. 
al. 2012 for further issues surrounding the proper inter-
pretation of  these effects),  we omit this  case from our 
discussion  due to its entanglement with these larger is-
sues.
good present additional experimental evidence that 
the  anti-entailment  intuition  is  widely  shared. 
Moreover,  responding to Rose and Schaffer,  Mur-
ray  et  al.  argue that  their  fndings  apply  equally 
well to the dispositional entailment thesis.  That is, 
Murray et al. argue that their fndings avoid Rose 
and Schaffer’s  criticism of  earlier  fndings on the 
anti-entailment intuition.
Murray  et  al.  used  stories  featuring  diverse 
agents,  including  a  cash  register,  a  border  collie 
named ‘Cassie’, and God. They designed their stor-
ies and probes to avoid cueing a narrowly occurrent 
reading of  ‘believe’.  For example, here is one their 
stories:
Researchers  have  found  that  some  breeds  of 
dog  are  surprisingly  intelligent.  Amongst  the 
most intelligent are border collies. One border 
collie, Cassie, is even able to solve simple math-
ematical  problems:  If  you  ask  her  “what  is 
2+2,”  for  example,  she  will  bark  four  times; 
similarly,  if  you  ask  her  “what  is  4+5”  she’ll 
bark nine times!
In a within-subjects design, participants were asked 
two questions  (counterbalanced to avoid order ef-
fects): ‘Does Cassie know that 2+2=4?’ and ‘Does Cassie  
believe that 2+2=4?’. A non-trivial number of  parti-
cipants (28%) answered that Cassie knows but does 
not believe that 2+2=4.13 Moreover, of  those who 
ascribed  knowledge,  a  majority  (53%)  did  not 
ascribe belief, and of  those who did not ascribe be-
lief,  nearly half  (46%) ascribed knowledge. These 
are noteworthy results,  suggesting that  anti-entail-
ment  intuitions  are  widely  shared.  Importantly, 
Murray et al. claim,  for two reasons, that it’s un-
likely that  their  participants  were merely denying 
occurrent belief  in this case. First, unlike in Myers-
Schulz and Schwitzgebel’s  story about Kate, noth-
ing  “blocks”  Cassie  from “consciously  accessing” 
the relevant information (as Rose and Schaffer sug-
gest  regarding  the  Unconfdent  Examinee  case). 
Second, participants weren’t asked about “any par-
ticular  occasions”  where  Cassie  might fail  to con-
sciously endorse the proposition.
Murray  et  al.  observed  comparable  results  in 
13 Non-triviality was stipulated by Murray et. al. to be aver-
age  response  patterns  that  were  signifcantly  greater 
than 20%, where responses that were not signifcantly 
different  from  20%  were  interpreted  to  refect  mere 
“noise.” 
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three  other  experiments.  One  in  particular 
provided the most striking evidence that the entail-
ment intuition isn’t widely shared. This experiment 
featured  their  Geocentrist  case,  which  inspired  our 
earlier example of  Stewart  in  Section 114. Here is 
the Geocentrist case:
Karen is a frst-year student at a prestigious uni-
versity. She is a good student and has been do-
ing very well in her classes. One of  the classes 
she is taking is introduction to physics. One of 
the topics covered in this class is the place of  the 
earth in the solar system. For example, one of 
the things  that  Karen has been taught  is  that 
the earth revolves around the sun. Prior to start-
ing at the university, however, Karen was home-
schooled by her parents. Karen’s parents taught 
her that the earth is at the center of  the uni-
verse.  Karen  accepts  what  her  parents  have 
taught her. In particular, despite what she has 
been taught in her physics class, she holds that 
the earth does not revolve around the sun. One 
of  the questions on the fnal exam in Karen’s 
physics  class  is  the  following:  “True  or  false: 
The earth revolves around the sun.” Karen an-
swers “true” on this question. She gets the ques-
tion correct and ends up scoring 100% on the 
exam.
The results from Geocentrist are very surprising. 
Nearly half  of  the participants (46%) answered that 
Karen knows but does not believe that the earth re-
volves  around  the  sun.  Of  those  who  ascribed 
knowledge, the vast majority (85%) did not ascribe 
belief. This is exactly the opposite of  what we would 
expect  if  participants  accepted  the  entailment 
thesis.  Distinguishing  between occurrent  and  dis-
positional belief  seems unlikely to explain the res-
ults.  Murray  et  al.  conclude  that  philosophers 
14 Our focus is on the Geocentrist case in part because it 
has been offered by others as one of  the strongest cases 
against  entailment.  Note  that  there  are  a  number  of 
worries about this case independent of  our hypothesis. 
For one, there is a risk that the story primes a specifcally 
religious  sense  of  "belief"  (though see below).  For an-
other,  the  vignette  includes  belief  terms  like  'accepts' 
and 'holds'.  Also,  knowledge ascription could be artif-
cially high due to the basic nature of  the claim, or the 
assumption  that  “everyone knows  the  earth  revolves 
around the sun”. We acknowledge these worries but set 
them aside in the ensuing discussion.
should neither take the entailment thesis for gran-
ted any longer,  nor assume that  people  generally 
fnd it intuitively compelling. Rather, the entailment 
thesis  “stands  in  need  of  positive  support.”  We 
agree that Murray et al..’s results  tend to  support 
these conclusions, and we applaud them for moving 
the discussion forward so productively. Complacent 
appeals to intuition  are no longer  respectable op-
tions for proponents of  the entailment thesis.
After  presenting  their  data  and  drawing  their 
critical conclusions, Murray  et al. respond to  sev-
eral objections and tentatively propose a hypothesis 
to  explain their fndings.  They propose that belief, 
but not knowledge, requires “conviction” or “men-
tal assent.” People are at least implicitly sensitive to 
this  fact,  which  explains  why  they  view  certain 
agents as having knowledge but not belief. Part of 
Murray et al.’s motivation for this proposal is that, 
to them, the availability of  information to the mind 
is “intuitively” insuffcient for belief. Murray et al. 
don’t commit to a specifc account of  what assent 
requires,  but  they mention  a  few possibilities,  in-
cluding “a particular type of  phenomenology — a 
subjective feeling of  conviction.”15
This strikes us as a potentially promising explan-
ation of  the extant fndings used to question the en-
tailment  thesis.  The  attentive  reader will  have 
already noted how much the “conviction account” 
of  belief  resembles our earlier characterization of 
thick belief. We return to this in the next section.
15 They also mention two other possible views about what 
assent requires. On one view, assent requires “believing 
a proposition on the basis of  deliberation regarding its 
justifcation.” On the other view, assent requires “expli-
citly  reflective deliberation.”  Murray et al.  don’t note it, 
but  Augustine  arguably held  a  related  view of  belief, 
what we might call the deliberative view. In On the Predestin-
ation of  the Saints (bk. 1, ch. 5), Augustine wrote, “No one 
believes anything unless he has frst thought that it is to 
be  believed.  For  however  suddenly,  however  rapidly, 
some thoughts fy before the will to believe . . . it is yet 
necessary  that  everything which is  believed should be 
believed after thought has preceded.” We think it highly 
unlikely  that  any  such  deliberative  view  of  belief  is 
either correct or a genuine principle of  folk psychology, 
though it’s arguably less implausible as a view about the 
requirements of  appropriate belief. In any event, we set it 
aside.
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3. Interlude
Each  set  of  studies  discussed  thus  far  teaches a 
valuable  lesson.  First,  Myers-Schulz  and 
Schwitzgebel  woke  contemporary  epistemology 
from  its dogmatic  slumber  about  the  entailment 
thesis by offering provisional evidence that the anti-
entailment  intuition  is  neither peculiar  nor  per-
verse.  Second, Rose and  Schaffer emphasized the 
importance  of  properly  framing  the  entailment 
thesis  and ensuring that  experimental  stimuli  cue 
the appropriate sense of  belief; otherwise, we’re in 
danger of  misinterpreting the results. Third,  Mur-
ray,  Sytsma  and  Livengood  renewed  the  experi-
mental challenge to the entailment thesis and pro-
posed  the conviction account of  belief  to explain 
why the entailment thesis is false.
We are no longer slumbering dogmatically;  we 
are sensitive to the need to appropriately frame the 
entailment thesis;  and we are alert to the import-
ance of  conviction to (the folk psychology of) belief. 
In short, we have taken these lessons to heart.  In 
what follows, we seek to advance the discussion in 
light of  them.
4. A thinly veiled thesis
Recall that Rose and Schaffer distinguished disposi-
tional  from occurrent  belief  and  argued  that  we 
should  understand  the  entailment  thesis  disposi-
tionally. This enabled them to reverse previous res-
ults  which  seemingly  threatened  the  entailment 
thesis. In addition to distinguishing occurrent from 
dispositional  belief,  we  will  now  apply  a  similar 
maneuver  in  response  to  the  latest  results  from 
Murray  et  al.  by  further  distinguishing between 
thick and thin belief.
Recall that a thin belief  is a bare cognitive pro-
attitude. To have a thin belief  that P, it suffces that 
you represent that P is true, regard it  as  true,  or 
take it to be true.  By contrast, thick belief requires 
more than a cognitive pro-attitude.  It also involves 
emotion or conation. Thick and thin beliefs can be dis-
positional or occurrent in nature.  Thick belief  en-
tails thin belief, but not vice versa.
We propose that the following thesis is true and 
refects  the  way  epistemologists  have  understood 
the relationship between knowledge and belief:
Thin entailment  thesis:  necessarily,  if  you 
know that P, then you thinly believe that P.
Following Rose and Schaffer, we also want to allow 
for a dispositional reading of  thin belief. Thus, the 
thin entailment thesis should also be understood in 
terms  of  implying  thin occurrent  or thin  disposi-
tional belief.
We think that  the thin entailment thesis is 
true and that it can be supported by two simple ar-
guments. Here is the frst argument. Knowledge it-
self  is a cognitive pro-attitude. That is, to know that 
P is a way of  regarding or taking P to be true. (Put 
another way: knowing that P is true is a way of  thinking  
that P is true.) Therefore knowledge is a form of  thin 
belief. Therefore the thin entailment thesis is true.
Here is the second argument. Suppose a speaker 
makes an  assertion.  As many have argued in the 
norms of  assertion literature, if  we respond by say-
ing  either “You don’t  know that,”  or  “That  isn’t 
true,” or “You don’t believe that”,  then we are in-
terpreted  as  rejecting  the  speaker’s  authority  to 
make the initial  assertion  (Unger 1975,  Bach and 
Harnish 1979, Williamson 2000, Weiner 2005). It’s 
a very interesting fact that all three of  these pos-
sible responses function this way. What explains this 
very interesting fact? The entailment thesis  follows 
from  the  best  explanation:  (i)  knowledge  is  the 
norm of  assertion (Williamson 2000: ch. 11; Turri 
2010; Turri  2011b;  Turri,  in press),  and  (ii) know-
ledge entails true belief, so (iii) by challenging either 
knowledge,  truth or  belief, one thereby challenges 
authority to assert (Turri 2010; Turri forthcoming). 
An unparsimonious  alternative,  which we fnd im-
plausible, is  that  knowledge,  truth  and belief  all 
function independently as norms of  assertion.16
We think that  the thin entailment thesis refects 
the way epistemologists have understood the  rela-
tionship between knowledge and belief because of 
passages like the following.  Consider how Richard 
Feldman, a leading epistemologist, explains the en-
tailment thesis in his recent textbook.
If  you know something, then you must believe it 
or accept it. If  you do not even think that some-
16 Technically,  there  are two  other alternatives  that  are 
parsimonious  but far more implausible, namely:  (a)  be-
lief  is the norm of  assertion and belief  entails truth and 
knowledge;  (b) truth is the norm of  assertion and truth 
entails  belief  and knowledge.  We assume that no one 
will take either of  these alternatives seriously.  For more 
on  the  connection  between  belief  and  assertion  see 
Rose, Buckwalter and Turri (under review).
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thing is true, then you do not know it. We are 
using ‘belief ’ in a broad sense here: anytime you 
take something to be true, you believe it. (Feld-
man 2003: 13)
Feldman’s  “broad  sense”  of  belief  is  thin  belief. 
Consider also how Linda Zagzebski, another lead-
ing epistemologist, explains some points of  “philo-
sophical consensus” about knowledge in her recent 
textbook.
Knowing is a relation between a conscious 
subject  and  an  object,  where  the  object 
is . . . some portion of  reality. The relation 
is  cognitive.  That  is  to  say,  the  subject 
thinks,  not  just  senses  or  feels  the  object. 
More specifcally,  knowing includes  believ-
ing.17 (2009: 3)
Zagzebski  also  adds,  “there  is  a  consensus  that 
knowing is a form of  believing.”
Notice that Feldman and Zagzebski both  speak 
of  thinking that something is true as a way of  elucidat-
ing the relationship between knowledge and belief. 
It’s natural to construe the relevant sense of  belief 
in terms of  ‘think’.18 This will be important below.
5. Thicker plot, thinner probe
The take-home lesson of  this section is that the thin 
entailment thesis is widely accepted. But our goal is 
not to dispute any of  the prior anti-entailment res-
ults  reported in Sections 2.1 or 2.3. Setting aside 
the  occurrent/dispositional  distinction  made  by 
Rose & Schaffer, we think that both Myers-Schulz 
and Schwitzgebel, and Murray et al., have admir-
ably shown that knowledge may not entail  (thick) 
belief. We now wish to add to these prior discover-
ies  the  further  claim  that  knowledge  does  entail 
(thin) belief  — the sense of  belief  that some cognit-
ive  scientists  and  contemporary  epistemologists 
have endorsed — together with evidence for these 
two distinct folk psychological categories of  belief.
More  specifcally,  we  will  argue  for  two  main 
17 We altered this quote by turning a numbered list into a 
simple paragraph.
18 Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) also seem 
to acknowledge this  point. They speculate that “‘think’ 
is often used in ordinary English to ascribe what philo-
sophers would call beliefs,” and proceed to use ‘think’ in 
additional experiments as an alternate way of  measur-
ing belief  ascription, with mixed results.
points. First, participants in Murray et al.’s studies 
tended to ascribe knowledge without belief  mainly 
because they understood “belief ” in the thick sense, 
while the storyline didn’t make clear that the prot-
agonist had a thick belief. Accordingly, their results 
don’t  suggest  that  the  thin  entailment  thesis  is 
widely  rejected.  Second,  participants  who  under-
stand “belief ” in the thin sense will respond just as 
we would  expect  if  the  thin  entailment  thesis is 
widely  accepted.  If  the  thin  entailment  thesis  is 
widely accepted and participants understand “be-
lief ”  in  the  thin  sense,  then  more  participants  will  
ascribe belief  than knowledge,19 and  very few participants  
will both ascribe knowledge and deny belief. (We will oper-
ationalize ‘very few’ in Section 5.1 below.)
To  demonstrate  our frst  point,  we  will  keep 
Murray et al.’s original probes but adjust their vign-
ettes to make it more plausible that the protagonist 
has a thick belief.  Call this the plot-thickening manipu-
lation. We predict that a signifcant increase in belief 
ascription will accompany  the plot-thickening ma-
nipulation.  To demonstrate  our  second point,  we 
will  keep Murray et al.’s original vignettes but ad-
just the probes so it’s clear that we’re asking about 
thin  belief.  Call  this  the probe-thinning  manipulation. 
We predict  that  three  things  will  accompany  the 
probe-thinning manipulation:  (1)  belief  ascription 
will  rise signifcantly,  (2)  belief  ascription will sur-
pass knowledge ascription,  and  (3)  the percentage 
of  participants  who  both  ascribe  knowledge  and 
deny belief  will decrease signifcantly.  Indeed,  re-
garding (3)  we expect this percentage to be  at or 
near foor  (again, we operationalize this notion in 
Section 5.1 below).
Of  course by just thickening the plot on its own, 
one might naturally expect belief  ascription to rise 
without the need to posit  additional  senses of  be-
lief.20 But  we  present  our  plot-thickening  and 
probe-thinning manipulations  in  tandem,  as one 
pincer motion.  That is, we will show that  holding 
fxed  the  plot  but  thinning  the  probe  results  in 
greater  belief  ascription.  And  conversely,  we  will 
19 Technically,  this  consequent clause  should  read,  ‘then 
the percentage of  participants who ascribe knowledge 
won’t be signifcant higher than the percentage of  parti-
cipants who ascribe belief.’  But since its harder to have 
knowledge than to have a belief,  it’s  natural to expect 
that belief  ascription will outstrip knowledge ascription, 
which is how we frame matters in the main text.
20 We thank Josh Knobe for discussion on this point.
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show that holding fxed the probe but thickening 
the plot also increases ascription. We present these 
two results  together as evidence in support of both 
thick and thin senses of  belief.
In making our  points, we will focus on Murray 
et  al.’s  three  most  promising  cases:  Geocentrist, 
Dog and God.21
As indicated earlier,  there could be many ways 
to “thicken” belief. Thus there could be many ways 
to augment the original stimuli so it’s clearer to par-
ticipants that the protagonist has a thick belief. For 
the sake of  clarity and defniteness, choices must be 
made. In the experiments below, our strategy  is to 
have the protagonists endorse the relevant proposition by 
explaining their  choice or  communicating the in-
formation to a social partner. Perhaps belief  ascrip-
tion in the presence of  this kind of  explicit endorse-
ment  is  not  a  surprising  result,  nor  a  result  that 
would be unique to our view. Nonetheless  it  is  a 
prediction of  our account of  thick and thin belief 
that this  feature is  more likely to cue thick belief 
ascriptions. Conversely, it would be problematic for 
our view if  endorsement of  this kind did not result 
in higher rates of  thick belief  ascription. Thus we 
include thick belief  cases as a crucial test of  the hy-
pothesis.  We designed a  common plot-thickening 
manipulation for Geo and Dog in order to show 
that endorsing a proposition is a cue to thick-belief 
ascription across different cover stories.
There could be many ways to cue the thin sense 
of  belief. Taking our cue from Feldman’s and Zag-
zebski’s  natural  use  of  ‘think’  in  the  passages 
quoted earlier,  we asked participants whether  the 
protagonist “thinks” that the relevant proposition is 
true. Moreover, bearing in mind Rose and Schaf-
fer’s fndings, we wanted to allow for a dispositional 
reading of  the question. To accomplish this, we in-
cluded  the  adverbial  phrase ‘at  least  on  some 
level’.22 Combining those two desiderata, we asked 
21 We omit their cash register case because it  raises deep 
questions about  the  nature of  cognition and  minded-
ness, which we can’t properly address in the present con-
text.  Relatedly,  it also  raises  interpretative  questions 
about  how  participants  view  mental-state  ascriptions, 
and questions about such ascriptions, when it comes to 
machines and instruments. 
22 This phrase also has one added bonus: it clears the way 
for ascribing  unconscious belief  too.  (If  Freud is correct, 
then unconscious belief  can be occurrent and thick (in-
deed, very thick), and unconscious belief  is not merely a 
participants, “At least on some level, does  S think 
that P?”, appropriately substituting for ‘S’ and ‘P’.
Having explained our strategic choices, we now 
turn to the experiments. Let’s thicken the plot, thin 
the probe, and then see what happens.
5.1. Experiment 1: Geocentrist case
5.1.1. Method
Participants (N=329)23 were randomly  assigned to 
one of three conditions. Participants in the Original 
Geo  condition received Murray  et  al.’s  original 
Geocentrist case.
[ORIGINAL GEO]24 Karen is a frst-year student 
at a prestigious university. She is a good student 
and has been doing very well in her classes. One 
of  the  classes  she  is  taking  is  introduction  to 
physics. One of  the topics covered in this class is 
the place of  the earth in the solar system. For 
example, one of  the things that Karen has been 
taught is that the earth revolves around the sun. 
Prior  to  starting  at  the  university,  however, 
Karen  was  homeschooled  by  her  parents. 
Karen’s parents taught her that the earth is at 
the center of  the universe. Karen accepts what 
her parents have taught her. In particular, des-
pite  what  she  has  been taught  in  her  physics 
species of  thin belief.)  The conscious/unconscious dis-
tinction hasn’t featured prominently in the  recent con-
troversy over the entailment thesis. But, for the record, 
we want  to allow that thin,  dispositional,  unconscious 
belief  suffces to satisfy the belief  condition on know-
ledge.
23 One-hundred  three female,  aged  18-65,  M=27 years, 
SD=8.25 years. As with the experiments reported below, 
participants  were recruited using Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, tested online using Qualtrics survey software, and 
compensated  $.25  for  approximately  2–3  minutes  of 
their time. Participants were not allowed to re-take any 
survey reported here,  and participants who had taken 
previous  similar surveys were excluded by their  AMT 
Worker  ID.  Participants  were  located  throughout  the 
United States. Ninety-seven percent reported English as 
their  native  language.  They  flled  out  a  brief  demo-
graphic survey after testing.
24 We use caps to name narrative elements, and we often 
name narrative elements after the experimental condi-
tions they were used in. This eases exposition and helps 
readers keep track of  which stories appeared in which 
conditions,  while  avoiding  any  undesirable  confusion 
between  the  experimental  conditions  and  the  stories. 
(Participants never saw the labels.)
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class, she holds that the earth does not revolve 
around the sun. One of  the questions on the f-
nal exam in Karen’s physics class is the follow-
ing:  True or  false:  The earth  revolves  around 
the sun. Karen answers “true” on this question. 
She gets the question correct and ends up scor-
ing 100% on the exam.
Participants in Original Geo were then asked two 
questions (options in brackets).25
Does  Karen  know that  the  earth  revolves 
around the sun? [Yes/No]
Does Karen believe that the earth revolves 
around the sun? [Yes/No]
Participants in the Thick Geo condition received 
the exact same treatment as Original Geo, except 
for  one  important  difference:  their  vignette  in-
cluded an additional  sentence designed to provide 
participants with evidence that Karen has a thick 
belief  (i.e. has “conviction” or “assents to” the rel-
evant proposition). To accomplish this in the addi-
tion below, Karen explicitly endorses the proposi-
tion that the earth revolves around the sun:
[THICKENED GEO] Later,  when  Karen  ex-
plains her answer to her friends, she tells them, 
“Of  course, I want to respect my parents, but I 
cannot deny the evidence we learned about in 
class that the earth revolves around the sun.”
Participants in the Thin Geo condition read the 
original  vignette,  ORIGINAL  GEO,  but  they 
answered a different question designed to cue thin 
belief, while leaving open the possibility of  disposi-
tional belief. These were their questions:
Does  Karen  know  that  the  earth  revolves 
around the sun? [Yes/No]
At least  on some level,  does Karen think that 
the earth revolves around the sun? [Yes/No]
5.1.2. Results and discussion
We made four main predictions. First, rates of  be-
lief  ascription  in  Thick  Geo  will  be  signifcantly 
higher than in Original Geo. Second, rates of  belief 
ascription will be signifcantly higher in Thin Geo 
than in Original Geo. Third, in Thin Geo  know-
ledge  ascription  will  not  be  higher  than  belief 
25 In all experiments reported here, questions and options 
were rotated randomly.
ascription.  Fourth,  the  percentage  of  participants 
who both ascribe knowledge and deny belief  will 
be signifcantly lower in Thin Geo than in Original 
Geo. For simplicity, let’s call participants who both 
ascribe knowledge and deny belief  the anti-entailment  
crowd. The  smaller  the  anti-entailment  crowd  in 
Thin Geo, the better for our view. Previous studies 
have shown that approximately 10-20% of  people 
are willing to ascribe knowledge of  falsehoods  (the 
anti-factivity  crowd).26 We will  feel vindicated  if  the 
anti-entailment crowd isn’t signifcantly larger than 
the  anti-factivity  crowd,  which  we  stipulatively 
defne at 15%.27
All four predictions were true. Only 11% of  par-
ticipants in Original Geo ascribed belief,  whereas 
61% in Thick Geo and 66% in Thin Geo did.28 In 
Thin Geo, belief  ascription (66%) was signifcantly 
higher  than  knowledge  ascription  (47%).29 The 
anti-entailment  crowd was signifcantly smaller  in 
Thin  Geo  (12%)  than  in  Original  Geo  (37%).30 
Moreover, the anti-entailment crowd in Thin Geo 
(12%) was smaller than the 15% target. These res-
ults are represented in Figure 1.
To summarize,  these results so far suggest that 
the protagonist in the original Geocentrist cases has 
26 Starmans and Friedman 2012, Turri 2013,  Buckwalter 
under review.
27 Recall that Murray et. al. stipulated anti-entailment re-
sponses falling at or below 20% should be interpreted as 
mere “noise” (see footnote 6).  We have lowered the bar 
thereby providing a more liberal standard for anti-entail-
ment.
28 Binomial,  both  ps<0.001.  For  all  reported  inferential 
statistics:  alpha  level=0.05,  95%  confdence  intervals, 
and  all  tests  two-tailed,  unless  otherwise  noted.  As  a 
control we also included the question “do you consider 
yourself  to be a religious person?”  We found no evid-
ence of  an association between answers to this question 
and participant ascriptions of  belief  (Fisher’s,  p = 0.51) 
or knowledge (Fisher’s, p = 0.67) in Original Geo. Thus 
it seems unlikely that the reluctance to ascribe belief  is 
the result of  the application of  at least any particular re-
ligious sense of  belief.
29 McNemar’s, p=0.018, one-tailed.
30 Fisher’s  exact,  p<0.001,  one-tailed.  Overall  response 
patterns for Original Geo, Thick Geo, and Thin Geo, 
respectively,  were  as  follows:  No  knowledge  no  belief 
(52%, 10%, 23%), no knowledge belief  (3%, 9%, 30%) 
knowledge no belief  (37%, 29%, 12%), knowledge and 
belief  (8%, 53%, 36%). Note roughly the same basic ef-
fect for anti-entailment (37%) as found by Murray et al. 
(46%).
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a  thin belief  but  not  a  thick belief  about  helio-
centrism. They also suggest that when the original 
case is thickened by having the protagonist  expli-
citly endorse the heliocentric proposition to peers, 
this  cues  ascriptions  of  thick  belief regarding  the 
heliocentric  proposition.31 Lastly,  since  the  entail-
ment thesis is best understood in terms of  thin be-
lief,  these  results  do not constitute a challenge to 
traditional entailment.
5.1.3. Objection and follow-up: matching 
knowledge probe
Before continuing, we would like to pause and ad-
dress  an  initial  concern  with  intuitions  in  Thin 
Geo.  We take it that results for our probe-thinning 
manipulation begin to show that people are using a 
different sense of  belief  in Thin Geo than in Ori-
ginal or Thick Geo.  However for the purposes of 
directly  testing  thin  belief  entailment  specifcally,  a 
more challenging test might be to compare ascrip-
tion rates for “at least on some level thinks that P” 
to rates for “at least on some level knows that P.”32 
All the better for our defense of  the thin entailment 
31 Increases  in  knowledge  ascription  in  Thick  Geo  may 
also  suggest  a  relationship  between  endorsement  and 
knowledge judgments to be pursued in future work.
32 We thank Josh Knobe for discussion on this point.
thesis  if,  even in this  alternative test,  people con-
tinue to ascribe knowledge at rates that do not sur-
pass belief.
To fnd out, we ran a follow-up experiment. We 
re-administered the  Thin Geo  case  verbatim, ex-
cept  this  time we  presented participants  (N=64) 
with the following two questions:33
At least on some level,  does Karen know that 
the earth revolves around the sun? [Yes/No]
At least  on some level,  does Karen think that 
the earth revolves around the sun? [Yes/No]
Here  we  found  that  response  patterns  mirrored 
those of  our earlier  study. The majority of  parti-
cipants ascribed both thin belief  (81%) and know-
ledge (80%). And only 8% of  participants ascribed 
knowledge without belief, which was marginally be-
low the 15% anti-entailment threshold34 This result 
suggests that thin belief  entailment continues to be 
supported  even  when  knowledge  probes feature 
matching “at least on some level” phrasing.
5.2. Experiment 2: Dog case
5.2.1. Method
Participants (N=322)35 were randomly  assigned to 
one  of three  groups.  Participants  in  the  Original 
Dog condition received Murray et al.’s original dog 
case.36
33 Twenty-nine female,  aged  18-62,  M=29.9  years, 
SD=9.13 years. Questions were counterbalanced for or-
der. There were no signifcant order effects on attribu-
tions of  knowledge (Fisher’s exact test,  p=0.54) or thin 
belief  (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.75).
34 Binomial,  p=0.068,  one-tailed.  Overall  response  pat-
terns were as follows: No knowledge no belief  (11%), no 
knowledge belief  (9%) knowledge no belief  (8%), know-
ledge and belief  (72%). 
35 One  hundred  twenty-two female,  aged  18-62,  M=28 
years, SD=8.33 years.
36 Some philosophers may argue that dogs cannot have be-
liefs. But insofar as this case is presented as evidence for 
folk anti-entailment intuitions, we set this worry aside.
Figure 1. Results of  Experiment 1. Top panel: percentage of 
participants in Original Geo, Thick Geo, and Thin Geo con-
ditions attributing knowledge and belief  . Bottom panel: overall 
response patterns;  the K (Yes) B (No) pattern shows anti-en-
tailment.
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[ORIGINAL DOG] Researchers have found that 
some breeds of  dog are surprisingly intelligent. 
Amongst the most intelligent are border collies. 
One border collie, Cassie, is even able to solve 
simple mathematical problems: If  you ask her 
“what is 2+2,” for example, she will bark four 
times;  similarly,  if  you ask her “what  is  4+5” 
she’ll bark nine times!
Participants in Original  Dog were then asked two 
questions.
Does Cassie know that 2 + 2 = 4? [Yes/No]
Does Cassie believe that 2 + 2 = 4? [Yes/No]
Participants in the Thick Dog condition received 
the exact same treatment as Original  Dog, except 
for  one  important  difference:  their  vignette  in-
cluded  two additional  sentences designed  to 
provide participants with evidence that Cassie has a 
thick belief.  To accomplish this in the addition be-
low, Cassie explicitly endorses the proposition that 
2 + 2 = 4:
[THICKENED DOG] In  addition  to  all  this, 
when  other  dogs  are  asked  the  answers  to 
simple math problems but they are unable to re-
spond correctly, Cassie will bark the correct an-
swers in order to help the other dogs solve the 
problems. It’s like she’s really trying to commu-
nicate the answer to them!
Participants in the Thin Dog condition read the 
original  vignette,  ORIGINAL  DOG,  but  they 
answered a different question designed to cue the 
conception  of  thin belief,  while  leaving open the 
possibility of  dispositional belief.  These were their 
questions:
Does Cassie know that 2 + 2 = 4? [Yes/No]
At least on some level, does Cassie think that 2 
+ 2 = 4? [Yes/No]
5.2.2. Results and discussion
We made four main predictions. First, rates of  be-
lief  ascription  in  Thick  Dog will  be  signifcantly 
higher than in Original  Dog. Second,  rates of  be-
lief  ascription will be signifcantly higher in Thin 
Dog than  in  Original  Dog.  Third, in  Thin  Dog 
knowledge ascription will not be higher than belief 
ascription.  Fourth, the  anti-entailment  crowd will 
be signifcantly smaller in Thin Dog than in Ori-
ginal Dog and not signifcantly higher than 15%.
All  four predictions were true.  Whereas 48% of 
participants in Original  Dog ascribed belief,  66% 
in Thick Dog and 70% in Thin Dog did.37 In Thin 
Dog,  belief  ascription  (70%) was  signifcantly 
higher  than  knowledge  ascription  (49%).38 The 
anti-entailment  crowd was  smaller  in  Thin  Dog 
(8%) than in Original  Dog (16%)  by a marginally 
signifcant amount.39 (Note that the anti-entailment 
crowd in Original  Dog in our study was signifc-
antly smaller than in Murray et al.’s original study 
(28%).)40 Moreover,  the  anti-entailment  crowd  in 
Thin Dog was signifcantly less than 15%.41 These 
results are displayed in Figure 2.
To summarize, these results suggest that Cassie, 
37 Binomial, both ps<0.001. As a control we also included 
the question “do you own a pet?” We found no evidence 
of  an association between answers to this question and 
participant ascriptions  of  belief  (Fisher’s,  p = 0.83) or 
knowledge (Fisher’s, p = 0.53) in Original Dog.
38 McNemar’s, p<0.001, one-tailed.
39 Fisher’s exact, p=0.059, one-tailed.
40 Binomial, p=0.002, one-tailed.
41 Binomial,  p=0.021,  one-tailed.  Overall  response  pat-
terns for Original Dog, Thick Dog, and Thin Dog, re-
spectively,  were  as  follows:  No  knowledge  no  belief 
(37%,  17%,  22%),  no  knowledge  belief  (16%,  16%, 
29%) knowledge no belief  (16%, 16%, 8%), knowledge 
and belief  (32%, 51%, 41%).
Figure 2. Results of  Experiment 2. Top panel: Percentage of 
participants in Original Dog, Thick Dog, and Thin Dog con-
ditions attributing knowledge and belief. Bottom panel:  overall 
response patterns; the K (Yes) B (No) pattern shows anti-en-
tailment.
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in the original Dog cases, has a thin belief  but not a 
thick belief  about  the sums. They also suggest that 
when the original case is thickened by having Cas-
sie explicitly endorse the  proposition to peers, this 
cues ascriptions of  thick belief. And again, since the 
entailment  thesis  is  best  understood  in  terms  of 
thin belief,  these results  do not constitute a chal-
lenge to entailment.
5.3. Experiment 3: God case
5.3.1. Method
For  our  fnal  experiment  we  revisited  Murray  et 
al.’s God case,  limiting our investigation to the re-
sponse  pattern  associated  with  the  thin  belief 
probe.42 Participants  (N=102)43 were  asked  two 
questions:
Does God know that 2 + 2 = 4? [Yes/No]
At least on some level, does God think that 2 + 
2 = 4? [Yes/No]
Participants  were  then  taken  to  another  screen 
(they couldn’t  go back and change their  answer), 
where they were asked,
Do you believe in God? [Yes/No]
5.3.2. Results
We made two predictions. First, knowledge ascrip-
tions would not be signifcantly higher than belief 
ascriptions.  Second,  the  anti-entailment  crowd 
would not be signifcantly larger than 15%. Both 
predictions  were  true.  Knowledge  ascription  was 
not signifcantly higher than belief  ascription — in-
deed, they were exactly the same (61%).44 And the 
anti-entailment crowd (7%) was signifcantly smal-
42 There are four reasons for this. First, we were confdent 
by this point that our plot-thickening manipulation was 
working effectively as predicted. Second, Murray et al.’s 
original God case was, unfortunately, a between-subjects 
design in which participants  were  simply probed with 
one question (either about knowledge or about belief). 
Consequently, there was no plot to thicken! Third, we 
agree with Rose and Schaffer that in testing entailment 
one ultimately wants to know whether the same person 
ascribes  knowledge but  not  belief.  A between-subjects 
design  is  thus  inadequate  for  this.  Lastly,  we’re  ulti-
mately most interested in what will happen when we use 
the thin belief  probe.
43 Thirty-three female,  aged  18-58,  M=27 years,  SD=8 
years.
44 McNemar’s, p=1.00
ler than 15%.45
We found that personal belief  in God predicted 
signifcantly  higher rates of  both belief  ascription 
(90/34%) and  knowledge  ascription  (94/30%).46 
This  is  unsurprising  because  atheists  don’t  think 
that God exists, and it’s reasonable to suppose that 
only existing beings believe and know things. Thus 
atheists should be  less likely to ascribe belief  and 
knowledge. Nevertheless, even when we control for 
personal belief  in God, we detect no threat to the 
thin entailment thesis.  Neither theists  nor atheists 
ascribed  knowledge  at  rates  signifcantly  higher 
than belief.47 Even theists don’t come close to a sig-
nifcantly higher rate of  knowledge ascription.
Murray et al.’s  original  study of  the God case 
used a between-subjects design, whereas we used a 
within-subjects  design.  So  a  direct  comparison 
across the two studies is fraught. Nevertheless, it’s at 
least worth noting that theists in our study were sig-
nifcantly more likely than participants in Murray 
45 Binomial, p=0.01, one-tailed. Overall response patterns 
for Thin God, and Thin God (Believers),  respectively, 
were as follows: No knowledge no belief  (32%, 2%), no 
knowledge belief  (7%, 4%), knowledge no belief  (7%, 
8%), knowledge and belief  (54%, 86%).
46 Fisher’s, both ps<0.001, one-tailed.
47 McNemar’s, both ps≥0.687.
Figure  3. Results  of  Experiment  3.  Percentage  of  parti-
cipants in Thin God and Thin God (Believers,  fltered for a 
personal belief  in God) conditions attributing knowledge and 
belief  top;  overall  response  patterns below.  The  K (Yes)  B 
(No) pattern shows anti-entailment.
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et al.’s study to ascribe belief  to God (90/73%),48 
even though rates of  knowledge ascription among 
theists in the two studies didn’t differ signifcantly.49 
These results are shown below in Figure 3.
5.4. General discussion of  our results
A  clear  pattern  emerges  from  the  three  experi-
ments.  First, it  is probable that Murray et al.’s ori-
ginal results are partly due to the fact  their probes 
cued  the  thick  sense  of  belief,  while  their stories 
didn’t make it clear that the protagonist had a thick 
belief. By thickening the plot, we were able to signi-
fcantly increase rates of  belief  ascription. Second, 
whenever we cued the thin sense of  belief,  parti-
cipants respond just as we would expect if  the thin 
entailment thesis is widely accepted. That is, when 
we thin the probe, participants consistently ascribe 
belief  at higher rates than knowledge and very few 
join the anti-entailment  crowd (i.e.  ascribe know-
ledge but deny belief).
All  of  our  results  suggest  that  the thin  entail-
ment thesis  is widely accepted. Indeed, it appears 
to be as frmly rooted as the factivity thesis in the 
ordinary view of  knowledge. That is, thin belief is as 
good a candidate as  truth for being a folk require-
ment on knowledge!50
Recall that although our aim in the present sec-
tion  was to defend the (thin) entailment  thesis,  the 
larger goal  of  this  paper has been to present evid-
ence for  the  thin and thick conceptions of  belief. 
The debate over ordinary intuitions and entailment 
has  merely  served as a convenient point of  depar-
ture toward achieving this latter goal. So do the res-
ults  taken  as  a  whole  support  this  conclusion? 
Though  more  empirical  work  needs  to  be  com-
pleted, we think that the experiments above begin 
to  demonstrate a  real  distinction  that  should  be 
made in both cognitive science and epistemology 
between thick and thin conceptions of  belief.  We 
now turn to examine the evidence in light of  this 
48 Binomial, p=0.008.
49 Binomial, p=0.15.
50 Our results provide intuitive support for the traditional 
thesis that knowledge entails (thin) belief. However, the 
thin entailment thesis is neutral with respect to a series 
of  further psychological questions, including the psycho-
logical  priority of  knowledge and belief.  For more on 
whether knowledge judgments are based on prior or ac-
companying judgments about belief, see Rose (under re-
view) and Buckwalter & Turri (under review b).
larger question, as well as consider one major ob-
jection to this claim.
5.4.1. Comparing types of  belief-ascription 
overall
For evidence in favor of  the larger claim regarding 
thick and thin belief  more generally, we conducted 
a post hoc test which collapses over  Original and 
Thick conditions in the Geo and Dog experiments 
above and compares  combined belief  and know-
ledge scores with ascriptions across all of  the Thin 
conditions  in Geo, Dog, and God.  We choose to 
collapse responses in this way in order to compare 
the  results  of  all  belief  ascription  (using  the  un-
adorned word ‘belief ’ in our probes) with thin be-
lief  ascription (or  using  the  adorned ‘at  least  on 
some level thinks’ method of  collecting  thin belief 
ascription).  
When  looking  at  these results  as  a  whole,  we 
continued to see signifcant differences supporting 
the claim that these are genuine and genuinely dis-
tinct  categories.  Specifcally,  46%  of  participants 
attributed  belief across  all  of  the  Original  and 
Thick conditions combined,  whereas 65%  attrib-
uted belief  across all of  the combined Thin condi-
tions  combined. And we saw the opposite pattern 
in knowledge ascription  across all of  the Original 
and Thick conditions (60%) when compared to the 
Thin conditions (52%).51
We also continued to fnd signifcant differences 
in how individual participants within each of  these 
combined conditions ascribed knowledge and be-
lief. There was signifcantly more knowledge ascrip-
tion than belief  ascription in  Original  and Thick 
conditions, and signifcantly more belief  ascription 
than knowledge ascription in Thin conditions.52
5.4.2. Within-subjects replications
In  our  discussion  of Myers-Schulz  and  Schwitz-
gebel’s original studies against the entailment thesis 
we mentioned one response by  Rose and Schaffer 
(section 2.2)  suggesting  that a  within-subjects design 
would have been more probative  than a between-
subjects design. This is why in our experiments on 
entailment (sections 5.1-5.3) we asked participants 
both questions about either thick or thin belief  to-
51 Knowledge, X2 (1)=4.82 p < 0.05. Belief, X2 (1)=26.94 p 
< 0.001.
52 McNemar’s test, ps < 0.001 for all comparisons.
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gether  with  questions  about  knowledge,  to  see 
whether  the  same  person  would  attribute  know-
ledge but deny thick or thin belief. But what about 
thick and thin belief  themselves? Will evidence for 
these distinct categories persist when the same per-
son is asked about both concepts of  belief?
As an added dimension  of support  in favor of 
the distinction between thick and thin belief  in folk 
psychology,  we sought  to  replicate  the  effects  for 
thick and thin belief  using the Geocentrist and Dog 
cases  from Experiments 1 and 2  within subjects,  or 
among the very same groups of  participants. In this 
follow-up experiment, participants  (N=100)53 were 
presented with either the Original Geo or Original 
Dog vignette, followed by verbatim thick and thin 
belief  probes used above (see appendix for materi-
als).
In both cases, the result was a replication of  the 
earlier  fndings  showing  signifcant  differences  in 
thin  and  thick  belief  attributions.54 Thin  belief 
ascription was at  52%  in Original Geo compared 
to  20%  thick belief  ascription.  Similarly,  68% 
ascribed thin belief  in  Original Dog as compared 
to  46%  ascribing  thick  belief. These  results  are 
shown in Figure 4.
5.4.3. The limits of  thin belief
One potential  worry  one  might  have  is  that  our 
strategy for cuing thin beliefs across Experiments 1-
3 does not rise to the minimal level suffcient for be-
lief. In fact, a version of this same basic worry was 
anticipated by  Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel  in 
their original paper. When speaking of  some addi-
tional  experiments  they  had  conducted  using 
‘thinks’ as an alternative measure for belief  ascrip-
tion (see footnote 18)  they write, “We hypothesize 
that some respondents may have interpreted ‘think’ 
in these scenarios as something like guess or suspect 
rather than believe.”  It  would be problematic for 
our account of  thin belief if  at least one version of 
Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel’s hypothesis  turns 
out to be correct, namely that people who randomly, 
equivocally,  or  blindly guess  that P  are  viewed as  “at 
least  on  some  level,  thinking  that  P.”  In  other 
words, it would be problematic if  people attributed 
thin belief  using our metric in a maximally inclus-
53 Thirty-one female,  aged  19-75,  M=29 years,  SD=9.32 
years.
54 McNemar’s, ps < 0.01 for all comparisons.
ive and indiscriminate way.
To  begin  addressing this worry  about the min-
imum level  for  thin  belief,  we  conducted  a  fol-
low-up study. Participants (N=107)55 were presented 
with a new case very similar to the original Uncon-
fdent  Examinee  frst  administered  by  My-
ers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel.  However in our case 
the protagonist, Sloan, was not a model student like 
Kate:
Sloan  is  a  real  slacker.  He  enrolled  in  Astro-
nomy 101 this semester but he never attended a 
single class and he never did any of  the assigned 
reading. Sloan is completely unfamiliar with the 
course  material,  but  the  fnal  exam  is  mul-
tiple-choice  and  he's  hoping  that  he  can  get 
lucky and pass. Question 72 on the exam asks, 
"Which of  the following best approximates the 
value  of  the  gravitational  constant?"  The  op-
tions are:
A. 6.7 x 10-21 m3/kg s2
B. 6.7 x 10-11 m3/kg s2
C. 6.7 x 10-12 m2/kg s3
D. 6.7 x 10-11 m2/kg s3
E. 6.7 x 10-10 m3/kg s2
Sloan randomly selects option B, which is the 
correct answer.
Participants then saw one of  three questions to 
gauge  thick  belief,  thin  belief,  and  knowledge 
ascription:
Does Sloan believe that 6.7 x 10-11 m3/kg  s2 is 
the best approximation?
At least on some level, does Sloan know that 6.7 
x 10-11 m3/kg s2 is the best approximation?
At least on some level, does Sloan think that 6.7 
x 10-11 m3/kg s2 is the best approximation?
If our method for collecting thin belief  does not rise 
to a minimal level necessary for belief  — but rather 
resembles something akin to mere guessing — then 
we  would  expect  high  thin  belief  attribution  to 
Sloan. If  this is the case then we would also expect 
thin belief  ascription at rates that  signifcantly  ex-
ceed ascriptions of  thick belief  and knowledge.  In 
other words, if  thin belief  is  ascribed more indis-
criminately than thick belief  in situations of  mere 
55 Forty-nine female, aged  18-71,  M=32 years,  SD=11.11 
years.
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guessing, we would expect higher thin belief  ascrip-
tions relative to rates of  thick belief  ascription.
Contrary  to  these predictions,  however,  we 
found that participants were generally unwilling to 
ascribe thin belief,  thick belief  and knowledge to 
Sloan. Responses to all three questions were signi-
fcantly below chance.56 Only 28% of  participants 
in this case  ascribed thin belief,  or answered that 
“at least on some level” Sloan thinks  that  his an-
swer is correct. And most crucially, thin belief  was 
not ascribed at signifcantly higher rates than either 
thick belief  (23%)57 or knowledge (17%).58
These results  suggest that our thin probe does 
cue minimal features  suffciently  rising to the level 
of  belief. That  is,  these  results  provide  evidence 
that the folk psychological concept of  thin belief  re-
quires more than guessing. Some may fnd this res-
ult  surprising.  After  all,  it  might  be  thought, 
“doesn't  someone  who  randomly guesses  that  P 
represent P as true?” But the vast majority of  parti-
cipants did not attribute thin belief.  In fact, parti-
cipants ascribed thin belief  at rates similar to thick 
belief  and knowledge.
Despite these results, we also acknowledge that 
more empirical work than space currently allows is 
needed to investigate the lower bounds of  the folk 
psychological  conception  of  thin  belief.  For  in-
stance,  even  though  the vast  majority of  parti-
cipants did not attribute  either  thick or  thin belief 
to Sloan in the control above, it’s still puzzling that 
23–28% of  participants  attributed belief.  Further 
work could proftably investigate why this propor-
tion of  people indiscriminately ascribes belief, both 
thin and thick.
While this is an interesting question, it’s import-
ant to emphasize that these results do not detract 
from our argument for thick and thin concepts of 
belief.  Nor do these results suggest that a rump of 
indiscriminate  thin-belief  ascription  can  explain 
our  earlier  results.  For  instance,  the  Geocentrist 
case (Section 5.1)  displays a  very large shift  from 
the percent of  participants who said that “Karen 
believes that the earth revolves around the sun” in 
the  original  condition  (11%)  to  the  percent  who 
said that she “at least on some level thinks” in the 
Thin  Geo  condition  (66%).  It’s  implausible  that 
56 Binomial, all comparisons ps<0.05.
57 Fisher’s exact, p = 0.79.
58 Fisher’s exact, p = 0.40.
that difference could be explained in terms of  par-
ticipants allowing guessing to count as thin belief. 
For in order for such an explanation to work, parti-
cipants would need to indiscriminately apply thin 
belief  but not thick belief. However, our follow-up res-
ults suggest that thin and thick belief  are indiscrim-
inately ascribed at the level of  guessing at similarly 
low rates. 
We would also like to point out that independent 
of  these discussions,  the minimal  pro-attitude ne-
cessary  for  belief is  an  interesting  philosophical 
question in its own right, itself  open for debate. Re-
lated to this, note that  there are more  or less dis-
criminating concepts  of  ‘guessing’.  For  example, 
some of  the more discriminating or less  inclusive 
concepts of  guess are ‘conjecture’, ‘extrapolation’, 
or ‘educated assumption’.  To use our terminology, 
these attitudes  might well  suffce  to  represent in-
formation as true in a way we suspect many would 
fnd suffcient for thin belief. For more on this ques-
tion, and  for  additional  experiments  on the lower 
bounds of  thin belief, see additional work by Buck-
walter and Turri (under review)  on the thick/thin 
distinction.
6. Conclusion
We interpret our results to refect a genuine distinc-
tion between  thin and thick belief  in folk psycho-
logy.  Once  these  two  conceptions  of  belief  are 
properly accounted and controlled for,  the way is 
clear to a proper understanding and defense of  the 
entailment thesis. The entailment thesis should be 
understood thinly, and when participants are effect-
ively probed, they reveal a strong commitment to 
that thesis.  Epistemologists can now enjoy an em-
pirically informed justifcation for including a belief 
condition  in  their  theories  of  knowledge. The 
thick/thin distinction enabled this impressive result. 
We humbly submit that this is an adequate down-
payment on our hypothesis.
We will conclude by briefy suggesting some fur-
ther,  potentially  important  applications  of  the 
thick/thin distinction. Earlier we observed that dis-
cussions in contemporary philosophy of  mind and 
cognitive science have typically focused on thin be-
lief.  More often than not in these discussions,  thin 
beliefs are treated as information about the world 
that  is  internally  represented  and  stored  in  the 
mind. But although it seems possible to have a par-
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tial  belief  or  a  full  belief  of  many  different 
strengths, mental representations appear to be dis-
crete — you either have one in your mind or you 
don’t. So we take it that one historical challenge to 
traditional representational views of  belief  (as seen 
in  theories  ranging  from  Fodor  1990  to  Searle 
1983) is that they must somehow account for the 
continuous nature of  belief.
Noting the apparent diffculties  that representa-
tional theories  have with partial or degrees of  be-
lief,  one  might  reject  the  traditional  representa-
tional view and develop an entirely new account of 
belief  (for this see Schwitzgebel 2001 and 2002).59 
However,  rejecting  the  traditional  representation 
view of  belief  on the ground that it cannot accom-
modate the continuous nature of  belief  might be 
premature. For the traditional representational pic-
ture can be aided by distinguishing two  categories 
of  belief:  thick and thin belief.  Drawing on these 
two  categories,  one  might  make  a  plausible  case 
that thin beliefs, whether occurrent or dispositional, 
are associated with discrete representations,  while 
thick beliefs have additional properties that are con-
tinuous. And we suspect that the features that cue 
intuitions about partial belief  and degrees of  con-
fdence along this continuum — things like the as-
sociated phenomenology of  belief, or one’s willing-
ness to assert or endorse a belief  as the basis for ac-
tion — will be features that typically also cue judg-
ments about thick beliefs. If  correct, this distinction 
may potentially aid representationalists in account-
ing for intuitive features of  belief  like the possibility 
of  partial or in-between belief.
Thinking thick and thin about the nature of  be-
lief  may also contribute to ongoing debates regard-
ing doxastic norms and the ethics of  belief  forma-
tion.  For  instance,  one  such  debate  involves  the 
question of  whether beliefs are formed voluntarily 
or involuntarily,  and subsequently,  how this ques-
tion bears on whether agents can be held normat-
ively  responsible for  forming  them. A number of 
different positions have been defended in this liter-
ature  (ranging  from Pascal  1670  to  Weatherson 
2008) regarding what has come to be known as the  
doxastic involuntarist challenge.  In short, the challenge 
is to explain how one can be held responsible for an 
59 Also see Schwitzgebel (2010, 546-548) for pragmatic ar-
guments in favor of  “thicker” propositional and reactive 
attitudes more generally.
action (forming a belief)  that is  beyond one’s con-
trol.  
Here too the thick/thin belief  distinction may 
be of  service. For it seems that thin beliefs are typ-
ically formed involuntarily, on the basis of  perceiv-
ing and representing information about the world. 
Thick  beliefs,  on  the  other  hand, are  typically 
formed voluntarily, on the basis of more refective 
cognitive pro-attitudes,  conation,  or  endorsement. 
If  so, then distinguishing between beliefs may allow 
philosophers  and cognitive  scientists  to retain the 
basic idea that (thin) belief  formation is predomin-
antly involuntary, while also  clearing the way for 
the normative evaluation of (thick) beliefs.60
Lastly,  applying  the  thick/thin  distinction  to 
questions in the ethics of  belief  formation may lead 
to applications in moral philosophy more generally, 
where  moral agents’  beliefs often feature promin-
ently.  For  example,  consider  the  ongoing  debate 
between  motivation  externalists  and  motivational 
judgment  internalists  in  metaethics  (e.g.  Stocker 
1979,  Korsgaard  1986,  Smith  1994).  Internalists 
contend, roughly, that sincere moral judgment en-
tails  a  motivation  to  act  in  accordance  with  that 
moral  judgment,  while  externalists  deny  this.  Al-
though the  connection  between  moral  judgment 
and motivation has been spelled out a number of 
different ways among motivational externalists and 
internalists,  it  is  frequently  done  so  in  terms  of 
either belief that a certain moral proposition is true, 
or the motivation that such a belief purportedly en-
tails.
Though  we  have  now  traveled  some  distance 
from  entailment,  we  think  that  drawing  on  the 
thick/thin conceptions of  belief  may help resolve 
disagreements  between  motivational  externalists 
and internalists, insofar as the connection between 
moral judgments and motivation hinges, in part, on 
substantive views of  belief. For instance, if  motiva-
tional judgment internalists cast their view in terms 
of  thick beliefs, it seems very plausible to conclude 
that endorsement or conviction that P would entail 
motivation to act in accordance to P. Alternatively, 
if  the notion of  belief  at play is thin belief,  then 
motivational  externalism  seems  quite  plausible. 
Simply representing information as being the case, 
60 This is reminiscent of  responses by Audi (2008) and Co-
hen (1992) distinguishing between belief  and acceptance 
for the purposes of  normatively evaluating beliefs.
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or believing in the thin sense, does not seem to re-
quire any further conviction or motivation to act in 
accordance with P (for more on this application of 
thick and thin belief  see Buckwalter and Turri, un-
der review). We present this and the other examples 
above not as an argument for one of  these views, 
but simply as a further illustration of how clarifying 
and applying these features of  (thick and thin) be-
lief  might prove crucial to  ongoing  theoretical ar-
guments both within traditional epistemology, and 
well beyond.61
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